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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 25/06/2008

Accident number: 584

Accident time: 12:45

Accident Date: 13/04/2008

Where it occurred: Sabha, Almafraq,
Sabha1(392)

Country: Jordan

Primary cause: Other (?)

Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: None

Date of main report: 13/04/2008
Name of source: Demining NGO
involved

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: M14 AP blast

Ground condition: rocks/stones
Date last modified: 25/06/2008

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
metal-detector not used (?)
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?)
use of rake (?)

Accident report
Details of this accident were made available by the demining NGO involved soon after it
occurred in April 2008. The record was supplied as a *.PDF file and some of the formatting
has been lost in its conversion to a DDAS file. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This
record will be revised if more information becomes available.
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Preliminary Demining Incident Report
From: [Demining NGO] 13/4/2008 06:10 PM
To: National Committee for Demining & Rehabilitation, Amman, Jordan
Subject: Demining Incident Initial Report

1 Organisation sub unit, site office/project number, team name/number: [Demining NGO],
NBP (Sabha), SP1
2. Location (province, district, village, task no): Sabha, Almafraq, Sabha1(392)
3. Date and time of incident: 13/04/2008 12:45 PM
4. Name of the injured: [the Victim]
a) Names or casualty identification numbers (CIN). Deminer
b) Description of injuries: Fracture in the heel and Secondary Frag in the Legs
c) Treatment given: Evacuated to KAH
d) Current condition of casualty (ies): Stable. No problem he stayed in the hospital for more
inspections
5. Evacuation methods, routes, destinations and estimated arrival times.
Time of accident: 12:45hrs
Time of arrival at the section medical point: 13:50hrs: 65 minutes
6. List equipment/facilities/infrastructure damaged: No Damage
7. Describe how the incident occurred.
The deminer was working within the Site Preparation Stage to identify the centre of the mine
line and an IOE was already identified and recovered the expected mines about 15m to our
side from the mine centre line which already quality up to the assigned depth (15cm) and all
the mines recovered from the site were a surface mines and when the deminer trying to bring
out some stones he stepped on un expected mine in the site with the heel.
8. Contact details of key personnel: [Name removed]
9. Any other information including:
According to the preliminary investigation the incident is caused due to unpredictable risk (the
mine is not in the predict depth and site) according to the Mine field record and laying pattern.
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[Many mines are visible in the minefield.]
a) Did the incident occur in a cleared, safe or contaminated area? Accident occurred in the
cleared area
b) Device type (if known): Anti personnel Mine M14
10. Any other relevant information.
Detailed Accident Report will be submitted within 7 days.
This report was done by the NPA internal Investigation Board comprising of Operations
Coordinator and Sector Coordinator.

Mine Incident Details
Introduction
Lane (2/6) where the incident took place was closed on 27 March 2008 because the Deminer
who was working in that lane belong to Alrisha team and he attached to Sector Coor dinator
[Name removed] to join the manual clearance team and be ready for sharing Alrisha team
clearing the first clearance task on the 1st Apr 2008.
On 13 Apr 2008 the casual assign to continue the work in that lane as a part of SP to identify
the turning point in that site and he recovered an AT (M19) mine and returned it to the mine
pit after been defused by the section commander and proceeded his work and while he trying
to move some stones out side the Lane in the area which supposed to be cleared he stepped
on mine in his right foot.
The deminer evacuated as per [Demining NGO] NBP SOP and the site Closed for
investigation.
Lane History around the Accident Site
[Table listing personnel who worked in the area removed.]

Accident Reason Assumptions
1. Assumption 1: The mine laid on a depth more than 15cm.
A. Analysis

3

i. The area was stepped and used from the day that the mine was passed (expected on 24
Mar 08) up to the accident day (13 Apr 08) which support the idea that the mine was deeply
buried and it need a heavy weight to activate it in that depth under the loosened dirt and that
needed came from the casualty when he stepped on the mine spot with his right foot and was
carrying a bucket of stones more than 20Kg and lifting the another foot that all the weight was
approximately in the mine at least 100kg (the deminer + the stones bucket).
ii. The accident result shows that the mine was not contact to the bottom of the mine boot or
at least with the distance of the sett off of the mine (10 cm)
iii. The trenches depth in both side close to the accident shows that the area raked up to more
than 15 cm and the area around the accident was loosened up to more than 15cm when the
30cm marking stick used to gauge the depth but this not found an accurate indicator for the
depth because when it used in the unraked area it gave high depth because the area is not
hard.
B. Conclusion.
i. To avoid a similar accident the area must search up to 20cm through the site preparation
phase.
ii. The area that includes the clusters must be search up to 30cm all the ways even if all the
mines of the cluster found and recovered.
iii. In a situation of missing mine the missed mine drill must be applied and the sector
coordinator have to evaluate the situation himself.
2. Assumption 2: The mine missed from the deminer on a depth less than 15cm
A. Analysis
i. All the mines around the cluster in the mine accident vicinity were on the surface and there
is no indication for a water course or flood to support the suspicion that the mine deeply
buried.
ii. By investigating the site accident and gauged the distance from the explosion remnants
(which represent the bottom of the mine ) the depth was 17cm and if subtract the mine length
(5cm) the result (12cm) represent the distance from the top of the mine to the surface (the
depth of raking).
B. Conclusion.
i. The mine maybe missed by the deminer as a result of not applying the required depth or by
not applying the raking methodology standard especially raking tray.
ii. To avoid a similar accident the raking depth must be applied by enforcing the internal QC
from the Section commander up to the Ops Manager.
iii. The areas around the clusters and in the expected [area] checked thoroughly and
evaluated from the sector coordinator before continuing the work.
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[Measuring crater depth]
3. Assumption 3 the mine [was] shifted to the accident site after the area have been
cleared
A. Analysis.
i. The lane was stepped many times forth and back by the deminer, the section commander,
the team leader, the sector coordinator, the TS sector coordinator and the ops coordinator for
at least 4 days after the deminer cleared the mine accident area.
ii. The work stopped in the line on 26 mar 08 because Alrisha team moved to prepare the a
clearance tasking and refreshed to be ready for the 1st clearance task in MF 398 and the
work proceeded in the lane on 13 Apr 08 (16 days after closing the lane).
iii. The mine site is irregular (not in the expected position) comparing with the MF records, the
mine pattern and the clusters in the vicinity.
B. Conclusion.
i. Lightly combing the site which need to be closed for a long time and visually check the lane
when reopened for work to see any trace of animals or disturbance the already cleared lane.
ii. Recovered all the AP mines that the grabber can reach (1m) and marking it the same way
(1m on the both sides of the lane) before closing it.
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[The accident site.]
Result.
1. Assumptions 1 and 2 controlled and the accident can be avoided by following the
mentioned recommendations.
2. Assumption 2 is not controlled but following the mentioned recommendations the risk can
be minimized and even if it’s not reasonable it still assumption.
3. Assumption 2 is more likely represent the fact because the inputs for this assumption are
more reasonable and the site investigations supporting it.

Recommendations
1. Reinforcing the internal QC.
2. Increasing the depth of raking in the site preparation stage to 20 cm.
3. Applying the missed mine drill.
4. disposing all the recovered mines by the end of the working day and if for any reason the
mines need to be disposed later the mines must counted and sustained in a locked cage.
5. Issuing a written warning letter for in charge sector coordinator.
6. Replace the team leader and the section deminer.
7. Suspend the deminer who cleared the lane.

Victim Report
Victim number: 760

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: 65 minutes

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Not recorded

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
minor Legs
severe Foot
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Other” because it seems likely that the mine
was either concealed too deeply to be found during the raking method used to clear breaches
into the minefield, or the mine was deliberately moved into a cleared area. Calculating the
depth of the mine by examining the crater is unreliable without a soil-hardness tester, so the
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investigator’s belief that it was deep is unproven. The ground was hard and rocky and most
mines were either shallow or visible. Having examined the area myself, I can see no way that
a single mine could have become deeply buried. This means that the deliberate replacement
of one of the many mines that were visible surrounding the breaches in the minefield appears
the most credible explanation of the presence of this mine in the centre of a well traversed
area that had been cleared using rakes.
The secondary cause is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the investigators
determined that the internal QA may not have been reliable and saw fit to discipline the field
controllers and the deminer who originally cleared the breach.
The investigation is listed as inadequate because it lacks the detail required in the National
Standards and in the demining group’s SOPs.
This record will be revised if more information becomes available.
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